The King, The Sultan and The Caliphate, Part 3
From his weapons on the open road, no man should step one pace away.
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Erdoğan has had success in implementing Islamism and consolidating power, but Turkey remains a long-standing republic. For The Sultan to take the next step away from democracy and towards authoritarianism he needs something to show for his new power as President. Thus far, events have not gone in Erdoğan’s favor.
Given the constraints he faces, Recep Erdoğan is unlikely to get his wish to be Sultan Erdoğan. But that does not mean his career in politics is over, Recep has a knack for taking care of himself at the expense of those who keep his company.
The Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia faces threats on three fronts. Within the family he has made many enemies. Indeed, he has kept his mother and father away from each other for fear that his mother will convince King Salman to pick a new Crown Prince. If King Salman stays alive for too long, MBS might lose his job as Crown Prince.
Turkey’s Brotherhood
Islamists in Turkey put a more nationalistic spin on their rhetoric than Islamists in other countries. Turkish Islamists, like their peers, view Islamic civilization as fundamentally different from Western civilization. However, the Turks romanticize the Ottoman Empire and view it as a golden age for the region. They also view the period from 1920-2002 when there was no Sultan or political Islam in Turkey as an aberration caused by alien principles from the West being imposed on Turkey. In Erdoğan’s worldview, Mustafa Kemal is not viewed as a father of the nation, but rather a misguided military officer.
To the Kemalists and their opponents, secular nationalism represented a radical break from the past. Previously, sovereignty had been held by a 600-year old dynasty that ruled in the name of Islam with sharia law. Ottoman legitimacy rested on a shared Muslim identity and a willingness to meld traditions with neighboring cultures. Kemal’s strategy was to trade Muslim solidarity for ethno-nationalism in order to conform with Western views on what a sovereign body should “look” like. “Turkishness” rather than Islam became the bond between the people and the state.
To completely uproot Islam from public life would have sparked a counter-revolution. Instead, the Republican elite tried to tame Islam and subordinate it to the state. Religious personnel, property and institutions were put under state control. But despite the best efforts of the Kemalists, Turkish society remains highly religious and conservative, especially the Kurds. Kemal believed that nationalism would strengthen the state’s grip on Anatolia. However, his suppression of Kurdish identity had the opposite effect, generating resistance and separatism.
After nearly one hundred years, Islamists concluded that the nationalist route to unity does not work. The ascension to power of the ‘Justice and Development Party’ (“AKP”) in 2002 was seen by many in the West as a watershed moment that proved Islamism and democracy are compatible. The founders of AKP, including Erdoğan renounced any desire to change Turkey’s secular system. AKP presented a populist vision where citizens would be masters of the state. This vision drew in secular-liberals, business leaders and Kurds to its ranks.
The party leadership also wore their piety on their sleeves and wanted to bring social norms in Turkey into line with Islamic norms. Theirs was a “soft” Islamism where the government encourages, but does not compel, adherence to Islamic social norms. They were called “Muslim Democrats” in a reference to the Christian Democrat parties of Europe.
The worldview of the AKP leadership, particularly Erdoğan, is based on a grand pan-Islamic narrative where an Islamic neo-Ottoman state restores the greatness of Turkey. The Middle East is seen as an organic whole where Turkey is the natural leader and the West is inherently alien. Accordingly, the carving up of the Ottoman Empire resulted in ethnic and religious turmoil, which was the goal of the Imperial Powers. Islamism provides a tool to reach beyond Turkey’s borders via a neo-Ottoman policy. Their worldview is not unusual or unique and has been developing since the death of Mustafa Kemal.
AKP holds the deposed Sultan Abdülhamid II in high esteem. He was a despot who blocked liberalization of Ottoman politics. He suspended the Ottoman Constitution of 1876 about a year after was created and disbanded the newly-formed legislative body, the Ottoman Assembly. He was a champion of Islam but had no major diplomatic achievements. He made extensive use of Islamic rhetoric and is known for reviving the use of the term “Caliph” alongside that of Sultan.
The Saudi Brotherhood
Traditionally, the Muslim Brotherhood has not gained much traction in the Kingdom. Wahhabism was originated locally and has always served as the benchmark for the government when setting social policies. More importantly, Wahhabi doctrine explicitly rejects democracy as un-Islamic. The people of Saudi Arabia have been reluctant to take up an ideology that could keep them out of Heaven.
The Sahwah (Islamic Awakening) movement began in the early 1990s as a response to Western troops being stationed in the Kingdom, growing secularism and increasing comfort with Western values. One branch of the Sahwah, the ‘al-Shu'aybi School’, embraced Muslim Brotherhood doctrine and fused it with local Wahhabi traditions. This Saudi Brotherhood rejected the notion of absolute devotion to the ruler and supported and overthrow of the royal family. In 2003 the government cracked down on the Shu’aybi School. Many of their scholars have been locked away since.
The ranks of imprisoned and disaffected clerics grew when those who MBS felt did not sufficiently support the blockade of Qatar were imprisoned and charged with crimes punishable by death. A very wide net was cast and many non-political ulama were caught up in the crackdown. This is the fatal flaw of MBS’s strategy of bullying the clerics into supporting his policies. As the number of imprisoned dissident clerics rises there will be an accompanying rise in the number of un-imprisoned clerics who question the legitimacy of the monarchy. Indeed, the process is already in motion.
Intercepted messages from imprisoned clerics to their supporters on the outside indicate that the imprisoned ulama are divided on whether to accept the rule of Mohammed bin Salman or endorse an attempt to overthrow him. However, sentiment is shifting towards supporting a Wahhabi Caliphate. Whether MBS can avoid a downward spiral in his relationship with the clerics will be a key determinant of political stability in the Kingdom.
Of course, the government will not do away with the apolitical establishment Wahhabi. The royal family needs an “in-house” ulama staff to provide religious legitimacy for controversial policies. For example, the establishment ulama smoothed the way for driving privileges for women by issuing fatwahs in support.
In addition, a Saud family divorce from the Wahhabi ulama would immediately give the jihadis claim to the unofficial title of ‘Guardians of Islam’. The emergence of the terrorist group Islamic State forever changed the relationship between the clerics and the monarchy.
The Sultan is Tested
After taking control in 2002, Gülen and Erdoğan began systematically clearing secularists out of the government and military. Gülenists, who tended to be more educated than Erdoğan supporters, were placed in senior positions across the bureaucracy.
Once there was no longer a shared enemy, Erdoğan and Gülen turned on each other. In 2011, Erdoğan refused to include some Gülenists in parliamentary elections. In 2012, after nationalist Gülenists protested Erdoğan’s peace talks with the PKK, Erdoğan had Gülenist schools closed. In retaliation, Gülenists in the police and prosecutors launched investigations on AKP senior leadership, including Erdoğan and his family. Erdoğan responded by closing Gülenist newspapers and television stations, seizing companies owned by Gülenist supporters and purging government officials.
Erdoğan’s return to religiously oriented rhetoric marked his turn towards autocratic policies. After winning the presidency in 2012 Erdoğan said: “My brothers, today not just Turkey, but Baghdad, Islamabad, Kabul, Sarajevo and Skopje have also won. Today, Damascus, Allepo, Hama, Homs, Ramallah, Nablus, Gaza, and Jerusalem have won.” Since 2014, Erdoğan has increasingly said that he represents the “will” of the Turkish people and nation. He turned on the liberals and secular elites by calling them traitors and whipping up religious sentiment.
Then, in August 2016, Gülenist military officers handed Erdoğan what he described as “a gift from God” – a failed coup. During the summer of 2016 the military had been planning purge of Gülenists supporters among the officers. The attempted coup occurred a few days before the purge was to begin.
Erdoğan made use of the coup to conduct a maximalist purge of Gülenists. Over 150,000 civil servants were dismissed, 64,000 arrests were made, 5,000 academics and 4,500 judges and prosecutors were fired. Also 189 media outlets were closed, and 317 journalists were arrested. The government issued an emergency decree providing immunity for anyone acting against terrorism or attempts to overthrow the government.
The US and EU were slow to condemn the coup. Indeed, the US and EU condemned the response to the coup more than the coup itself. Russia was the first to do so and Putin hosted Erdoğan’s first trip abroad after the attempted coup. It is worth noting here that Erdoğan had good reason in 2016 to turn towards Russia after the actions of his “allies” made it clear they hoped the coup would succeed.
Much can be learned about the political situation in Turkey by watching Erdoğan’s hands. From 2012 to 2017, Erdoğan consistently used the four-fingered right-handed “Rabia salute” showing solidarity with the Muslim Brotherhood. However, in the lead up to the June 2018 Presidential election he switched to nationalist salutes. Indeed, Erdoğan’s handywork included the four-fingered “Gray Wolf” salute of Bozkurtlar, a far-right ultra-nationalist group.
After winning the 2018 election Erdoğan immediately began transforming Turkey’s government from a parliamentary system to a highly centralized presidential system. Among many new powers the President of Turkey now has the power to issue decrees (less force than law), propose a budget, appoint ministers and bureaucrats (without a confidence vote) and to appoint the Council of Judges and Prosecutors.
Erdoğan’s knowledge of militant racist sub-culture got him to 52% in the July 2018 Presidential Election and provided an opportunity to consolidate power. But his handywork sends conflicting signals about policy goals and sets up a difficult situation down the road. Nationalists want relations with Assad to prevent a Kurdish autonomous region and a return of Syria’s 3.5 million refugees. Islamists want an overthrow of Assad and reproach with separatist Kurds.
During AKP’s rise to power Erdogan relied on religiously conservative Kurds to receive his message of political Islam favorably and cancel out the virulently anti-religious Kemalists. However, the breakdown of peace talks with Turkey’s Kurdish rebels (the PKK) and open conflict with Kurds in northern Syria (the YPG) has completely alienated a major portion of his historic base[1]. Compensating by playing to nationalists won the election, but it makes a policy of neo-Ottomanism – reliant on a common bond of Islam for diplomacy – hard to pull off.
Khashoggi
Members of the religious establishment and powerful members of the Saud family have been angered by the de-Wahhabization drive implemented by MBS. These members of the family, particularly Prince Turki, kept Khashoggi living comfortably while in exile. The assumption behind media reports in the US was that Khashoggi’s job as a Washington Post columnist and his support for “democracy” meant he must be a liberal in the Western use of the term. However, Khashoggi was a Wahhabi ideologue. After leaving Saudi Arabia his primary objective became the overthrow of the monarchy in favor of an “Islamic democracy”.
Khashoggi was no ‘Joe Reporter’ chasing down a story. He was a player who knew Erdoğan and was close to his advisors. He was an advisor to Prince Turki al Faisal, former head of Saudi intelligence, during the Prince’s time as ambassador to the US and UK. Recently, Khashoggi founded a nonprofit called Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN) and was in the process of raising funds to create a media organization akin to Al Jazeera.
“The eradication of the Muslim Brotherhood is nothing less than an abolition of democracy and a guarantee that Arabs will continue living under corrupt regimes.”
“There can be no political reform and democracy in any Arab country without accepting that political Islam is a part of it.”
Khashoggi was vocal in his opposition to terrorism and embraced peaceful coexistence between Muslims and non-Muslims. However, he did not believe that Western-style civil freedoms were appropriate for an “Islamic Civilization”. In October 2017, he described Wahhabism as a “moderate religious approach” that should be the base on which Saudi Arabia is built. “[E]veryone in the Kingdom sees the Brotherhood’s ideas are more civilized than Salafi thoughts.” He felt that secularism was the enemy and that for Saudi Arabia to confront Iran successfully it must embrace and identity as a Wahhabi revivalist state governed as an Islamic democracy. Because of his political views and ties to the royal family, Khashoggi became the de facto head of the Muslim Brotherhood’s unofficial Saudi branch. It was Khashoggi’s efforts to set up a Muslim Brotherhood media platform in Turkey with Qatari money that got him killed. He was a soldier in a war of ideologies, and a soldier’s death he received.
The Saudis have not always been hostile to Brotherhood groups outside of the Kingdom. The Kingdom regularly gave haven to Brotherhood supporters fleeing Egypt and Syria and provided support to Brotherhood groups when it was strategically beneficial. But open support for the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Yemen made Muslim Brotherhood ideology a threat to the family.
The assassination of Khashoggi threw the royal house into disarray. King Salman sent the Governor of Mecca to meet with Erdoğan to come to a friendly agreement, but no deal was struck. The Sultan must have turned down billions. Indeed, the Saudis publicly expressed anger that Erdoğan did not respect “regional rules” by refusing “significant” compensation. The assassination was an opportunity too good to pass by.
Playing up the “media assassination” angle allowed Erdoğan to distract from his administration’s own mistreatment of journalists and make MBS look unreliable. In doing so Erdoğan implicitly emphasized to NATO the importance of Turkey as a reliable strategic partner in the region.
The degree of Saud family-level concern is apparent from the return of Prince Ahmed bin Abdulaziz, the King’s sole surviving full-brother and member of the Sudairi Seven, recalled from exile. He returned, after six years spent in London, with a US-provided security detail and assurances of safe passage by King Salman. The return of Prince Ahmed is a safety measure to restructure the dynasty and put off transfer of power to a new generation, if necessary.
The incident was an embarrassment, but two months after the assassination MBS was making a comeback tour. At the G-20 summit he rewarded Bahrain and Egypt for their loyalty with billions of dollars of investment. The democratically elected President of Tunisia met MBS at the airport and bestowed the nation’s highest official honor on him. Not coincidentally, Qatar backs the opposition Islamist party in Tunisia. The Tunisian government was rewarded with a $500m loan and $140m of investment projects for its warm hospitality. Pakistan, the only Sunni nation with (or even close to having) nuclear weapons received $20 billion in aid and investment from MBS last week. In return the Crown Prince was given a gold-plated H&K MP5 sub-machine gun.
Money, Power, Respect
Mohammed bin Salman and Recep Erdoğan are both walking tightropes with unchallenged absolute power as the prize at the finish. The price of failure for each man ranges from humiliation all the way up to death. The longer it takes to attain unchallenged power, if it can be achieved at all, the higher the price of failure will be.
The situation in Turkey is likely to come to a head sooner and, as such, will come at a lower price. Erdoğan has had much success in his efforts to implement Islamism and consolidate power for himself, but Turkey remains a long-standing republic. For The Sultan to take the next step away from democracy and towards authoritarianism he needs something to show for his new power as President. Thus far events have not gone in Erdoğan’s favor. Concerns about emerging markets, Turkey in particular, have made it impossible for Erdoğan to rely on an easy-money, deficit-funded economic boom. At the same time, Assad has solidified power and a semi-autonomous Kurdish region is forming that will cut Turkey off from the Arab world. Those factors make foreign policy a bad place to look for a win as well.
Given the constraints he faces, Recep Erdoğan is unlikely to get his wish to be Sultan Erdoğan. But that does not mean his career in politics is over, Recep has a knack for taking care of himself at the expense of those who keep his company. Erdoğan was careful to be respectful to King Salman throughout the Khashoggi incident. Erdoğan did not implicate the King in the plot and showed defference by referring to King Salman as the custodian of the two holy mosques. Turkey also has not condemned Iran as an enemy, nor has it fueled anti-Shia sentiment. Indeed, Erdoğan says “My religion is Islam” when asked about the Sunni/Shia issue. Erdoğan does a good job of keeping his options open.
The military hardware put in place by Russia and the economic ties forged between the two countries since 2017 takes unilateral military action by Turkey off the table. Turkey will consolidate control over the territory it has already in northwestern Syria and use the remaining ungoverned areas in Idlib province as bargaining chips to limit Kurdish autonomy in Syria. Without the mantle of Sultan available, Erdoğan has no choice but to turn towards nationalism to continue accumulating power. Given the constraints of Syria and Iran, Turkish nationalism can only be directed east. Erdoğan still needs to win elections and he will go where the electoral winds take him. The main threat Erdoğan faces is financial instability - his friend the Amir of Qatar can provide help on that front, but cannot solve any problems.
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The potential outcomes in Saudi Arabia are much more variable and, because there is no voting to relieve social pressure. Mohammed bin Salman is clearly a man who wants to make his mark on the world. MBS had a vanity video made where he leads a column of tanks into Tehran and is greeted by cheering crowds holding pictures of him[2]. He wants to be remembered as his grandfather is and, as a result, sees the need to make high-risk/high-reward moves.
The Crown Price clearly understands that, for the monarchy to survive in Saudi Arabia, the economy needs to be diversified, the government made more efficient and the workforce participation rate needs to rise. However he is working under the constraints of social conservatism from the ulama and disparate government fiefdoms controlled by the various branches of the family. He has made bold moves to achieve his short-term goals, including: starting a war, having a high-profile journalist assassinated and imprisoning ulama who do not stand aside and hand him the fatwahs he demands. All high volatility bets.
The Crown Prince faces threats on three fronts. Within the family he has made many enemies. Indeed, he has kept his mother and father away from each other for fear that his mother will convince King Salman to pick a new Crown Prince. If King Salman stays alive for too long, MBS might lose his job as Crown Prince. If MBS does become King, a family-led coup such as the one led by Prince Faysal is a possibility. MBS also faces the threat of assassination, which ended King Faysal’s reign, or a serious uprising if enough ulama call for jihad against him. The threat MBS fears most is summed up perfectly in the quote below by Saudi religious scholar Salman al Audah, who has been charged with crimes punishable by death for failing to support the blockade of Qatar.
Fin.
What do you think? Has MBS advanced his goals of power without religious legitimacy? What are Erdogan’s chances of achieving power without needing democratic legitimacy? Please leave a comment, open to all.
[1] See my note “Escalating Risks in the Middle East, Part 3: Erdoğan and the PKK” of 19 June 2017 for an extensive discussion on the relationships between the major players in the Kurdish world and their relationships with outside actors.
[2] See: