The King, The Sultan and The Caliphate, Part 2
Rash is he who at unknown doors relies on his good luck.
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Wahhabism and the Muslim Brotherhood share a focus on implementing sharia law, a hostility to Western social norms and a desire for a return to “civilizational Islam”.
The emergence of the terrorist group Islamic State forever changed the relationship between Saudi clerics and the monarchy. No longer does the royal family have unchallenged claim to the status “Defender of Islam”.
Islamism and Its Forms
Wahhabism and the Muslim Brotherhood share a focus on implementing sharia law, a hostility to Western social norms and a desire for a return to “civilizational Islam”. The two ideologies also share a proselytizing vision of spreading Islam and their supporters fund massive recruiting networks operating across the Muslim world. But the two groups take opposite views on how an “Islamic State” should be implemented.
The Wahhabis believe that an Islamic State is achieved by individuals living a purist-Islamic life, which then spreads to the family and then society. A requirement for organizing society is an understanding that the words of the Prophet are the basis for all morality, social structure, and laws. In other words, a seed of pure Islam is sent out into the world, and it will grow into an Islamic society.
A network of charitable organizations, Imam training and mosque building programs (mostly funded by Saudi Arabia and Qatar) provide a platform to export Wahhabism. The network has been described as “Wahhabi International”. Indeed, the student body of the prestigious Islamic University of Medina is 80% non-Saudi. These Wahhabi-trained Imams will be sent back to their home countries to preach the literalist/expansionist form of Islam they have been trained in. With the Wahhabis there is no “intermediate” stage of Islamism, either an Islamic State is established, or it is not.
The Brotherhood spreads its message using an entirely different strategy. They view Islam as a comprehensive way of life, a “total system”. Therefore, a government is responsible for providing the institutions, structures and social support needed for citizens to lead an Islamic life. The population is not forced to adopt a purist Islamic lifestyle, but the pieces are in place for when they are ready.
Muslim Brotherhood ideology is spread through welfare services, political activism and change from within the existing system. The Brotherhood’s innovation was to link politics, culture, international relations and the Islamic dress code. These links provided an ideological vision understandable to all social groups. A distinguishing characteristic of the Brotherhood is its ability to spread throughout the Muslim world by partnering with pre-existing local groups and, once a foothold is established, infiltrating local politics. The Brotherhood’s strategy can best be described as: “Build it and they will come.”
The Saudi Brotherhood
Traditionally, the Muslim Brotherhood has not gained much traction in the Kingdom. Wahhabism was originated locally and has always served as the benchmark for the government when setting social policies. More importantly, Wahhabi doctrine explicitly rejects democracy as un-Islamic. The people of Saudi Arabia have been reluctant to take up an ideology that could keep them out of Heaven.
The Sahwah (Islamic Awakening) movement began in the early 1990s as a response to Western troops being stationed in the Kingdom, growing secularism and increasing comfort with Western values. One branch of the Sahwah, the ‘al-Shu'aybi School’, embraced Muslim Brotherhood doctrine and fused it with local Wahhabi traditions. This Saudi Brotherhood rejected the notion of absolute devotion to the ruler and supported and overthrow of the royal family. In 2003 the government cracked down on the Shu’aybi School. Many of their scholars have been locked away since.
The ranks of imprisoned and disaffected clerics grew when those who MBS felt did not sufficiently support the blockade of Qatar were imprisoned and charged with crimes punishable by death. A very wide net was cast and many non-political ulama were caught up in the crackdown. This is the fatal flaw of MBS’s strategy of bullying the clerics into supporting his policies. As the number of imprisoned dissident clerics rises there will be an accompanying rise in the number of un-imprisoned clerics who question the legitimacy of the monarchy. Indeed, the process is already in motion.
Intercepted messages from imprisoned clerics to their supporters on the outside indicate that the imprisoned ulama are divided on whether to accept the rule of Mohammed bin Salman or endorse an attempt to overthrow him. However, sentiment is shifting towards supporting a Wahhabi Caliphate. Whether MBS can avoid a downward spiral in his relationship with the clerics will be a key determinant of political stability in the Kingdom.
Of course, the government will not do away with the apolitical establishment Wahhabi. The royal family needs an “in-house” ulama staff to provide religious legitimacy for controversial policies. For example, the establishment ulama smoothed the way for driving privileges for women by issuing fatwahs in support.
In addition, a Saud family divorce from the Wahhabi ulama would immediately give the jihadis claim to the unofficial title of ‘Guardians of Islam’. The emergence of the terrorist group Islamic State forever changed the relationship between the clerics and the monarchy.
Wahhabi Islamism
Islamic State (“IS”) was initially viewed with sympathy in the Kingdom because it fed anti-Iranian and anti-Shiite sentiment. Thousands of Saudis left to join IS without protest by the government. However, the situation changed in June 2014 when the Caliphate was declared by IS. The Saudi government became hostile to IS and cracked down on local supporters.
The declaration of the Caliphate made IS an explicit threat to the royal family. Any Caliphate must control the two holy cities. IS denounced the monarchy and pledged to expand to control Saudi Arabia, claiming to be the true guardian of Islam. Since the 1990s the jihadi-Salafi movement has become more Wahhabi in orientation. From the point-of-view of an Islamic “purist”, Saudi Arabia and Islamic State are two competing models of the same system. Indeed, Islamic State governed its territory using the Saudi Kingdom of the mid-1700s as a template.
Despite its reverence for the first Saudi Kingdom, Islamic State departs from traditional Wahhabism in three ways. First, IS does not respect the dynastic alliance between Wahhab’s descendants and the Saud family. Second, there is no concept of a Caliphate in orthodox Wahhabism. Third, Islamic State members are obsessed with violence and death being used as a means of bringing about the end of the world.
After declaring the Caliphate, IS declared a strategy of attacking Shia, the Saud family and westerners. This stands in contrast to Al Qaeda’s strategy of primarily targeting westerners. The alternative strategy allows IS to claim that it is the guardian of Sunni Islam, which allows the group to justify in religious terms its goal to overthrow the Saudi monarchy.
After declaring the Caliphate, Islamic State began pouring resources into recruiting formally trained scholars. In the 1990s and early-2000s, Saudi-born clerics were the chief ideologues of the jihadi-Salafi movement. These were trained scholars who gave the movement, Al Qaeda in particular, legitimacy and ideological depth. Islamic State sought the same religious legitimacy and justification for its actions.
Islamic State’s recruitment-drive largely failed, but the idea of a Wahhabi Caliphate was a seed dropped into fertile ground. Suddenly, a religious justification for the overthrow of an un-Islamic and oppressive leader is available in a form compatible with Wahhabi doctrine. This is a radical concept for Wahhabis and one that appeals to Saudi Islamists dissatisfied with the monarchy.
Please share your thoughts on the topic. Will fundamentalist Islam topple the Saudi royal family? Can MBS gain secular legitimacy without being elected? Please leave your comments, open to all.
To be concluded in Part 3…